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I am grateful for the careful and painstaking effort
that Richard Porter and Edward Offenbacher have
devoted to replicating and extending parts of my
empirical work on the relationship between nonfinan-
cial economic activity and the economy’s total net
credit outstanding, and I welcome the chance to re-
spond to their paper as an opportunity to comment
on several important questions about monetary policy
in the context of that relationship. My views on these
issues are in agreement with those expressed by
Porter and Offenbacher, at least in most respects.
The research that I and others have done, high-
lighting the credit-income relationship in the United
States, raises two separate questions for the conduct
of monetary policy :
(1) Should the Federal Reserve System formulate
and implement monetary policy in terms of pre-
specified targets for the growth of a small
number of financial aggregates?
(2) If the Federal Reserve does make monetary
policy in this way, which aggregates should it
use ?
In addition, Porter and Offenbacher raise a meth-
odological issue about the statistical techniques em-
ployed in some parts of my empirical work on this
subject:
(3) What light can the results of vector autoregres-
sion analysis shed on either of these questions-
or, for that matter, on any other policy ques-
tions ?
I shall comment in turn on each of these issues.
Aggregate Targets for Monetary Policy
As I have argued in some detail elsewhere,
1 on
strictly economic grounds the use of financial aggre-
gate growth targets as the central focus of monetary
policy is clearly inferior to more flexible policy pro-
cedures. If a financial aggregate bears a close and
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See Friedman (1975, 1977).
reliable relationship both to the ultimate economic
objectives that the Federal Reserve wants monetary
policy to affect (for example, price inflation and real
economic growth) and to instruments directly under
the Federal Reserve’s control (for example, nonbor-
rowed reserves or the federal funds rate), then it is
at least plausible to conduct monetary policy by first
determining what target growth rate for that aggre-
gate is most likely to be consistent with the specific
desired pattern of economic objectives and then con-
ducting open market operations so as to achieve that
growth target as closely as possible. As is now
widely understood, this familiar two-step procedure
is equivalent to using the chosen financial aggregate
to summarize, in a specific way, all developments that
affect the impact of monetary policy actions on the
ultimate economic policy objectives.
The most obvious shortcoming of this two-step
procedure is that it fails to take advantage of relevant
information about such developments contained in
readily observable variables other than the chosen
aggregate. Moreover, except in extreme circum-
stances this procedure does not even use efficiently
the information that the chosen aggregate does con-
tain. The argument against the two-step procedure  is
essentially unchanged if the Federal Reserve bases
policy on growth targets for more than one aggregate,
although then there is the additional complication of
determining the relative importance to be attached to
each one.
On strictly economic grounds, therefore, the Fed-
era1 Reserve should not use financial aggregate
targets at all, but should instead use the most efficient
available way of incorporating into its policy actions
all relevant and available information-in practice, a
combination of econometric tools applied to some
areas and judgment applied to others that are less
conducive to explicit quantitative treatment. Never-
theless, since the early 1970s the Federal Reserve
has, with varying dedication, made growth targets for
the standard monetary aggregates the principal focus
of U. S. monetary policy, and the central banks of
other major industrialized economies have adopted
similar approaches. The reason, of course, is that
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(and should be) apposite to the structuring of eco-
nomic policy procedures. In the United States, the
Federal Reserve is responsible to the Congress for
the conduct of monetary policy, and Congress accord-
ingly bears responsibility for overseeing the Federal
Reserve’s actions. In the course of seeking a policy
framework that will enable it to execute this over-
sight responsibility, Congress has legislated a role
for money and credit aggregates in the monetary
policy process.
One theme running throughout Porter and Offen-
bacher’s paper is that, although in the work on which
they focus I have advocated the use of a credit target
for monetary policy, the empirical results I have re-
ported there do not make the bottom-line case for the
use of such a target. Porter and Offenbacher are
entirely correct in this regard. They are correct be-
cause the goal of this work was not to address the
primary issue of whether the Federal Reserve should
focus monetary policy on a growth target for credit
or any other financial aggregate, but instead,  taking
as given  that the Federal Reserve does use such
targets, to ask the more limited question-discussed
immediately below-of what specific aggregates it
should use. Moreover, at a more fundamental level
Porter and Offenbacher would be correct in this
regard in any case, regardless of the objectives I had
intended. Whatever justification there is for the use
of financial aggregate growth targets in the monetary
policy process must ultimately rest on political or
organizational (bureaucratic) considerations, not
economic ones. No set of empirical economic findings
can resolve these conflicts.
Money and Credit Aggregates
If the Federal Reserve is going to use financial
aggregate growth targets to formulate and implement
monetary policy, it must specify which aggregates to
target. The prevailing legislation simply refers to
money and credit, appropriately leaving to the Fed-
eral Reserve the actual selection. In recent years
(until 1983), the Federal Reserve has reported to
Congress its targets for the growth of three mone-
tary aggregates (M1, M2 and M3) and one credit
aggregate (commercial bank credit).* In practice,
2 
Most observers believe that the Federal Reserve in
practice placed little if any emphasis on the stated bank
credit target, and Porter and Offenbacher reinforce this
impression by ignoring that it ever existed. For a brief
period, the Federal Reserve reported separate targets for
M1-A and M1-B.
most observers have concluded that the narrow” M1
aggregate has been the principal focus of policy.
I have argued for the use of total net credit as an
additional target for monetary policy, if policy is to
have such targets at all, for three reasons each closely
related to the structure of the policy process based on
aggregate targets: First, because of the potential
dangers of placing exclusive reliance on a single
aggregate, using two targets is better than using one
-especially when there is reason to believe that the
two draw on disparate sources of, information from
within the economy’s financial markets. A credit
aggregate, by drawing on the  liability side of the
economy’s balance sheet, supplements the information
about the economy’s asset holding contained in the
monetary aggregates, and thereby usefully diversifies
the information base underlying the signals that pre-
sumptively matter for monetary policy. Second, in
the United States the total net credit aggregate bears
as close a relationship to nonfinancial economic ac-
tivity as does any of the standard monetary aggre-
gates. This relationship is also not simply that of a
mirror reflecting what has already happened; rather,
credit contains useful information about future move-
ments of income and prices. Third, with some lag the
total credit aggregate bears a relationship to the
Federal Reserve’s direct operating instruments that
is roughly comparable to that for the standard mone-
tary aggregates. Hence over time the Federal Re-
serve plausibly could, if it chose, influence the growth
of total net credit.
Porter and Offenbacher focus their substantial and
impressive efforts on my empirical results document-
ing the relationship between total net credit and U. S.
nonfinancial economic activity. In particular, they
replicate and extend the work, that I did using vector
autoregression methods to examine dynamic aspects
of this relationship. Their individual findings are not
without interest, although in the end it is difficult to
know in what way (if any) they affect the overall
conclusion to be drawn from the analysis. As did I,
Porter and Offenbacher find that monetary aggre-
gates appear more closely related to nonfinancial eco-
nomic activity in some specific contexts, while the
credit aggregate is apparently more closely related in
others. They usefully reinforce this ambiguity by
demonstrating that many of the individual results are
“quite sensitive to slight changes in either arbitrary
or seemingly innocuous assumptions.” Not all. of
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3 but
on the whole the set of exercises they report provides
a useful addition to understanding of the relationships
involved.
I disagree in an important way with only two
aspects of Porter and Offenbacher’s attempt to con-
trast our mostly similar findings. The first is their
interpretation of the implications of the effect of
adding interest rates to vector autoregression sys-
tems including income and financial aggregates.
Mehra and Sims had earlier shown that the appear-
ance of a major role for money in the determination
of income typically disappears upon the introduction
of interest rates.” Porter and Offenbacher show a
similar result for the total net credit aggregate. In
addition, using comparisons among respective vari-
ance decomposition analyses, they argue that the
effect of introducing interest rates is even stronger for
systems including credit than for systems including
money. In my similar work on this subject, I have
found results leading to somewhat different conclu-
sions than those reached by Porter and Offenbacher,
5
but I surely agree that the relationships under study
are not invariant to the inclusion or exclusion of
interest rates.
Indeed, nor should they be. No familiar theory of
macroeconomic interaction implies that quantities
matter while relative prices do not. As I have
argued elsewhere,
6 it is helpful to think of the systems
under study here as consisting of three markets:
those for goods and services, for money, and for
credit. In addition to its three quantity variables,
such a system has two relative prices; as usually
stated, they are the price of goods in terms of money,
and the price of credit in terms of money-that is, the
interest rate. The primary thrust of my work on this
subject is to argue that what happens in both the
money market and the credit market is relevant to
the determination of income. It is possible, of course,
to attempt to capture the relevant information from
the credit market by using only that market’s quan-
3 
For example, I question the relevance in this context of
distinctions found by extending the simulations past
twenty quarters.
4 
See Mehra (1978) and Sims (1980).
5 
For example, in recent work with a six-variable system
including real income, prices, money (M1), total net
credit, the high-employment federal deficit as a percent-
age of potential income, and a short-term interest rate,
Richard Clarida and I have found that the distributed
lags on credit and the interest rate are each significant
at the .10 level in the real income equation. See Clarida
and Friedman (1984).
6 
See especially Friedman (1983).
tity, but presumably the associated price (the interest
rate) matters too. The information contained in the
credit quantity when it is the only aspect of that
market included will in general differ from the infor-
mation contained in the quantity when used in con-
junction with the interest rate.
What is the implication, for the choice of monetary
policy targets, of finding that interest rates do matter
in this context, perhaps even more than either
money or credit?
7 One possible implication would
be to reject financial aggregate growth targets alto-
gether in favor of gauging policy entirely by interest
rates, although that idea lies outside the scope of the
work under study here. In addition, the problems
with basing monetary policy entirely on nominal
interest rates are well known. Another possible im-
plication would be to argue for some combined
money-and-interest-rate system. A third would be
to choose a money-and-credit-and-interest-rate sys-
tem. Any of these is plausible. But there is no
reason to reject entirely the relevant information
from the credit market just because some of that
information is contained in the price (interest rate)
rather than the quantity variable, or because the
respective information contained in the price and
quantity variables overlaps.
The second aspect. of Porter and Offenbacher’s
paper with which I disagree is their presumption
that the theoretical foundation underlying the rela-
tionship to nonfinancial economic activity of M1 or
M2 is more substantial than that for credit. To be
sure, there are many models of the demand for money
for transactions purposes, as well as of the demand
for asset holding. Neither set of models, however,
necessarily matches up with the M1 or M2 aggre-
gates in the circumstances prevailing in today’s finan-
cial markets. The deposits and currency included in
M1 are hardly the only way of effecting transactions,
and M2 is far from identical to total liquid assets.
Failing these conditions, what is needed is a more
general theory describing the holding of inside assets,
and in particular relating inside asset holding to the
determination of nonfinancial economic activity. In
the end, however, theories of inside asset holding are
inseparable from theories of inside liability issuing.
Among the familiar financial aggregates, the only
one for which a genuinely well worked out theory
7 
In addition to the possible implications given here,
there is always the possibility that the interest rate merely
appears to be important in this context because of the
well-known forecast element in asset prices; see, for
example, Sims (1982). This possibility is greater the
longer is the term of the asset in question.
32 ECONOMIC REVIEW, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1983exists to relate it to nonfinancial economic activity is
the monetary base. Models in which all assets are
outside assets, and (inside) liabilities do not exist,
have been a staple of macroeconomics for decades,
and at the theoretical level they have delivered many
valuable insights. Whether such models are helpful
in choosing an aggregate target for monetary policy
is another question. The world they describe corre-
sponds to a modern economy only if inside assets and
liabilities exist but do not much matter. The empirical
evidence relating the monetary base to nonfinancial
economic activity suggests ‘that’ that is not so.
Apart from the monetary base, there is little way
of choosing for this purpose from among today’s
plethora of financial aggregates on purely theoretical
grounds. The practical question of what aggregate(s)
to use as the target(s) of monetary policy-again,  if
any are to be used at all-is an empirical issue. The
approach I took to address this issue was to employ a
variety of statistical approaches that previous re-
searchers had claimed offered empirical support for
using one or another money aggregate target and to
attempt to show that, on balance, they provided about
the same support for using a total net credit target’.
The vector autoregression methods on which ‘Porter
and Offenbacher focus were one of several such
approaches to which I turned in this spirit.
Porter and Offenbacher conclude their paper by
saying that “the most that can be said in Friedman’s
favor is that VAR methods are not capable of dis-
tinguishing the proper monetary target.”  But that is
exactly my point  -along with the parallel finding
that none of the other methods that I tried do so
either. The empirical evidence, no matter how
sorted, does not provide grounds for using a money
target instead of a credit target (or vice versa). In
the absence of any strong theoretical presumptions,
one way or another, how can one choose money
versus credit on the basis of the available evidence?
As Porter and Offenbacher partly acknowledge in
their introduction, the Federal Reserve has recently
resolved this issue by focusing on both money and
credit. Probably the best way to view this change is
as a response to the break-down of the traditional
presumption favoring M1. In October 1982, Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker announced a sus-
pension of the M1 target-in other words, a mone-
tary policy which deliberately moved in the direction
opposite to what would have been needed to restore’
M1 to (or even near) its 1982 target growth range.
In February 1983, the Federal Reserve included in
its formal report to Congress the “associated range”
for total net credit that Porter and Offenbacher
mention. In July 1983, the Federal Reserve reported
to ‘Congress that it had chosen to change the 1983
target growth range for M1 rather than pursue a
policy which. would restore M1 to (or near) the
initially stated target range. At the same time, it
reclassified the ranges for both M1 and total net
credit as “monitoring ranges.” Porter and Offen-
bacher simply do not say whether they agree with
these successive steps.
8 I believe that they were an
appropriate response to the situation and the evidence
at hand.
Value of the Vector Autoregression Method
Finally, a largely methodological issue that Porter
and Offenbacher raise is whether vector autoregres-
sion analysis can usefully address policy question
like those I have discussed above (or, indeed, any
others). Along with the finding by Porter and
Offenbacher of great sensitivity to apparently, small
and arbitrary details, there is the ‘broader, issue of
whether vector autoregression methods are capable
of judging what would happen under a new policy
regime because the regime change itself would in
general alter whatever structure underlies the vector
autoregression.
9 At the same time, Sims has argued
that these methods are typically more robust than
Porter and Offenbacher find, as well as that regime
changes of the kind that would pose such fundamental
problems do not represent the best way of thinking
about practical policy choices.
10
This reply is not the right place for a method-
ological discussion of the issues involved here. More-
over, I remain agnostic on the subject in any case.
That is why I used not only vector autoregression
analysis but other forms of evidence, as well as non-
empirical arguments, to make a case for including a
total net credit target in the monetary policy process.
My objective in the work on which Porter and Offen-
bacher focus was to be as methodologically catholic
8 
Even so, the evolution of the successive drafts of the
Porter-Offenbacher paper present an interesting case
study of the interaction between research and policy-
making in a bureaucratic setting. The earliest draft that
I received from the authors, written before the October
1982 suspension, maintained the implicit but nonetheless
clear presumption that M1 was the right target, and took
the question at issue to be whether anything in the
empirical evidence was sufficient to change that presump-
tion. The presumption in favor of M1 has gradually,
disappeared from subsequent drafts, so that the final
version in fact gives the stencil of the evidence the same
coloring I do.
9 
See, for example, McCallum (1983).
10 
See again Sims (1982).
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 33as possible. Beyond that, it was to play, deliberately,
on “the other team’s turf”-that is, to use forms of
evidence on which other researchers, who had claimed
a special positive and/or policy role for some mone-
tary aggregate, had relied to support their claims. I
concluded that this evidence is equally supportive of a
role for total net credit. I think Porter and Offen-
bacher agree.
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